People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 400 [1975] [a person's mere presence on the premises where suspected gambling is occurring is insufficient to justify a search]). . The reason the warrant did not describe the vehicles in this case, as in Dumper, is that the warrant application materials failed to mention the vehicles, which consequently fell beyond the scope of the warrant. The court issued a search warrant authorizing a search of Defendant's "person" and the "entire premises." The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision affirming Supreme Court's judgment ordering the suppression of physical evidence seized from two vehicles, holding that the search warrant materials failed to provide probable cause to search the vehicles. The Nissan, which was registered to Mr. Gordon's cousin, was parked in the driveway of the residence. The majority sets out for new territory both in terms of preservation of the issue and in determining when our decisions establish a state constitutional standard greater than that of the Fourth Amendment. Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 304 [1986], quoting People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 406-407 [1985]). People v Gordon People v Hansen (38 NY2d 17 [1975]), also cited by the Court in Sciacca, is likewise factually inapposite and not controlling. A search and seizure is not valid unless it is based on either a warrant that was issued based on probable cause that a crime had been committed or upon an exception. Video, Inc., 475 US 868, 872 n 4 [1986] [same, where the opinion "cited the New York Constitution only once, near the beginning of its opinion, and in the same parenthetical also cited the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution"]). The majority's "clarif[ication]" of the cases (which comes nearly a half century later), transforming them into state constitutional decisions, is nothing short of judicial legerdemain (majority op at 19). One should hope not. That Court did, however, leave no doubtat least in the view of any other court to consider the issuethat the Fourth Amendment permits the search of containers found on the premises, such as the vehicles here. A state appeals court tossed out Price's conviction for drug possession in May, saying it was based on evidence obtained during an illegal search of his luggage. Radel pleaded guilty in August 2019 to two counts of illegal gun possession. In People v Sciacca (45 NY2d 122 [1978]), we held that a warrant authorizing a search of a defendant's van does not permit a forcible warrantless entry into another person's locked buildinga garagein order to execute the warrant (id. . This Court has never held that a mere reference or citation to both a state constitutional provision and its federal counterpart is enough to preserve an argument that the parallel state provision provides for heightened protection. Authority to search a vehicle does not include authority to enter private premises to effect a search of a vehicle within those premises. Before Supreme Court, Mr. Gordon cited the same New York caselaw discussed above to argue that New York law has "consistently adhered to the position that a search warrant must specify the area to be searched." We next addressed the search of a vehicle associated with a residence in People v Hansen. The warrant application also detailed drug sales that took place in the street in front of the premises, including a controlled buy with a confidential informant, two undercover buys, and other transactions observed during surveillance of the premises. We explained that: "a warrant must describe the premises to be searched, and this warrant did not include the automobile, which was not on the premises when the police came with the warrant but which was driven into the driveway while police were there, [and therefore] it did not justify [a] search of the car" (id). In Hansen, we held that police officers had sufficient cause to search Hansen's residence after surveilling the residence for some time and observing pipes, scales, and other narcotics materials (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20). Supreme Court granted Mr. Gordon's motion to suppress. 2021 NY Slip Op 01093 The deponent set forth his experience, stating that he had been involved in more than 1,000 drug-related arrests, that he was familiar with the modus operandi of heroin dealers, that the activity taking place at the premises was consistent with narcotics transactions, and, based on the above, there was probable cause to believe drugs would be "found at the above described premises." Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law 431. District of Kansas : Civil Rights, Search and Seizure : Jury Trial : House v. Discipline in this area benefits not only the Supreme Court in determining its own jurisdiction, but also this Court in establishing a respected body of state constitutional law. Although some Federal Courts of Appeals have interpreted the Fourth Amendment in a manner that might permit the search here, we decline to follow suit. In the Nissan, which defendant was borrowing from the owner, the police found heroin, marijuana, cocaine, money, and drug paraphernalia. Those cases rested on both the New York and U.S. Constitutions as well as the Criminal Procedure Law to require a greater degree of protection for searches of vehicles than is now required under the federal circuit court law cited by the People. provided an affidavit to an Eastern District of NYmagistrate judge to request a search of Kayla. at 299). During the course of a narcotics investigation, police officers observed Mr. Gordon and at least one associate selling narcotics from a private residence; on several occasions, Mr. Gordon or an associate exited the residence, walked to the street and delivered an object to a waiting person in exchange for money. The defendant controverted the warrant, arguing that it was "constitutionally deficient for not 'particularly describing the place to be searched'" (Rainey, 14 NY2d at 36, citing NY Const, art I, 12; US Const, 4th Amend]). As part of the investigation, [*2]detectives prepared a search warrant application that alleged the following: (1) on August 13 and August 25, 2015, undercover detectives had engaged in two controlled buys of heroin from Mr. Gordon, (2) a confidential informant had participated in a third controlled purchase from Mr. Gordon, and (3) the detectives had observed several more likely narcotics sales on the evenings of August 25 and 26, 2015. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. The right of the people to be secure in their persons , houses , papers , and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Nevertheless, in our view, that does not render our repeated citations to the State Constitution meaningless. Every federal circuit court of appeals and every state high court that has addressed the questionuntil todayconcluded that vehicles are no different than other containers that might be found on premises, and, thus, heeding the directive from the United States Supreme Court that there is no constitutional distinction between types of containers, held that vehicles parked on the premises may reasonably be searched if they may contain the object of the search. The actions of the investigators in breaking and entering into the building were unreasonable, as there was "no evidence whatever which would indicate that the garage was a premises where the controlled activity was taking place. G.R. It's a fact that check cashing businesses handle a lot of cash and with a lot of cash comes a lot of reporting. This jurisdictional rule is grounded in the principle of federalism (see Long, 463 US at 1041, quoting Minnesota v National Tea Co., 309 US 551, 557 [1940] ["'It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions. THE STATE v. ROSENBAUM et al. Defense Attorney David Fischer successfully convinced Judge Kara K. Ueda in his motion to suppress the search and seizure because the stop itself for "illegal" tinted windows" was not legal and the subsequent search was not lawful because of the illegal stop and because the "pat search" was not lawful. Instead, this Court has repeatedly held that, to preserve a state constitutional argument, a defendant must specifically argue below that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution (see e.g. South Dakota v Opperman, 428 US 364, 367-368 [1976]; People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]). To the extent that the dictum in Sciacca was referring to a scenario where a search warrant only describes a particular structure, it has no application where, as here, instead of limiting the search to a specific structure, the search warrant authorizes a search of the "entire premises," which, as particularized in this case, included the house as well as surrounding private property. In this area of constitutional law, we have set forth principles that would be unduly weakened by the People's preferred rule (see People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407 [1985]). The dissent faults our prior decisions in Hansen, Dumper, Sciacca, and Rainey for failing to conduct an extensive analysis of whether state constitutional protections deviate from federal constitutional protections in this context, while simultaneously acknowledging that our state caselaw delineating that particular analysis postdates those decisions. Accordingly, those courts have held that, under the Fourth Amendment, "[a] search warrant authorizing a search of a certain premises generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if the objects of the search might be located therein" (United States v Gottschalk, 915 F2d 1459, 1461 [10th Cir 1990]; accord United States v Armstrong, 546 Fed Appx 936, 939 [11th Cir 2013]; United States v Johnson, 640 F3d 843, 845 [8th Cir 2011]; United States v Patterson, 278 F3d 315, 318 [4th Cir 2002]; Evans, 92 F3d at 543; United States v Duque, 62 F3d 1146, 1151 [9th Cir 1995]; United States v Singer, 970 F2d 1414, 1417-1418 [5th Cir 1992]; United States v Reivich, 793 F2d 957, 963 [8th Cir 1986]; Percival, 756 F2d at 612; United States v Asselin, 775 F2d 445, 447 [1st Cir 1985]).[FN4]. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. Facing steeper political headwinds than past cycles, the executive branch is packaging the spying authority known as Section 702 as more than a counterterrorism tool. In Sciacca, our statement that "a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises" was arguably dicta because the facts there involved whether a search warrant for a vehicle authorized an intrusion into a premises, and not vice versa. Posted on 26 Feb in greenshield pharmacy intervention codes. The Appellate Division affirmed, concurring in Supreme Court's conclusion that "the search warrant did not particularize that a search of the vehicles was permitted" and "probable cause to search those vehicles had not been established in the application for the search warrant" (169 AD3d 714, 714-715 [2d Dept 2019] [internal citations omitted]).